The Unjust Review of Homophobia Explained 2/6
MY REPLY
There is no "logical" flaw. The reviewer simply misunderstood the use of "this or that action makes it more probable that....":
Nowhere did I, by necessity, claim that the agent, by choosing some action, changes the past or, more precisely, the existence/presence of the genetic factor leading to smoking/cancer or fecundity/homosexuality. We must, however distinguish between various causal constellations here. I treat first the constellation suggested by Camperio-Ciani and the reviewer, namely that there is some maternally inheritable genetic factor causing both excessive female fecundity and male homosexuality:
In that case, consider an agent who is or has become heterosexual: If, among the causes of homosexuality is the one just mentioned, he is simply less likely to have inherited the "mad about men"-gene than a fellow man who is homosexual. The homosexual is more likely to have inherited the "mad about men"-gene if it exists at all. The empirical evidence this is based upon and that the reviewer claims is missing is simply Camperio-Ciani's result that female maternal relatives of gay males are more fecund than those of straight males.
And so, if you have a man who becomes homosexual, he will, after that, be a homosexual man, i.e. belong to the homosexual sample group or be in a perfect condition to belong to it. And for that group it simply holds that a member of that group is more likely to have inherited the genetic factor. What else may have made him "choose" being homosexual? This factor would be one explanation for it! If a man becomes heterosexual, he will, after that, be a heterosexual male and, thus, he will be less likely to have inherited the "mad about men"-gene than a homosexual male! Maybe the absence of it has caused, among other things, his heterosexuality.
On the other hand, the reviewer bases his criticism on what decision theorists call "causal decision theory", which states that rational actions are to be for the sake of what they cause, i.e. -- according to sensible theories of causation -- for the sake of the future. Some claim, however, that this is an arbitrary and in certain aspects mythical/magical view on how rational actions work in Homo sapiens. There is another, evidential, view on decision theory according to which rational actions are to be for the sake of what they give evidence of or for. In this framework, the view that rational actions be for the sake of the future and not the past seems as arbitrary as the view that rational actions are to be for the sake of the east and not the west. To choose, e.g., becoming homosexual simply provides (probabilistic) evidence that the "mad about men"-gene is present, and, therefore, if you want to have the gene, you "choose" homosexuality if such choices are possible.
The reason causal decision theory can be regarded as magical/mythical in certain respects is that it is sometimes all too rigid and inflexible as far as causal constellations are concerned. One view of causal influencing is embraced, and if, *according to that view*, some choice cannot cause something the agent wants, the choice is left aside as an option/means of actively achieving what the agent wants to achieve. To speak clearly: The reviewer's criticism is valid only if the genetic factor theory as presented by Camperio-Ciani and him or herself is, indeed, valid. If some of the other possible causal constellations obtains, then it may be completely invalid:
e.g.: if there is no genetic factor for "mad about men" at all but, e.g., some simply "(male) gay gene", then it could be the case that homosexuals actively (as "prime movers") contribute to the fecundity boost among their maternal female relatives; Camperio-Ciani's result does, to my knowledge, not rule out that possibility -- and in that case you can even legitimately understand "this or that makes it more probable that..." in the way in which the reviewer misunderstood it, i.e., of course not as: "... (ACTIVELY) makes it more probably that the genetic factor is present" but as "becoming homosexual (ACTIVELY) makes it more probable that the females will be more fecund" just as the trait "jumping off high buildings" (ACTIVELY, in the "prime mover"-manner) makes it more probable that you die early.
To put that in a nutshell: Once you accept causal decision theory, you also accept a causal myth/story which has been told; or differently put: At a time when - as the reviewer himself or herself stated - the causal links of a correlation are not too obvious, as in the current case, there is too little reason to argue about decisions using a causal decision theory, even if it is - as I myself believe - better than evidential decision theory in the very end. Before the causal story is verified you should not base decisions on causal decision-theoretic arguments.