This describes a modification of the Moran process where individuals selection for copying can mutate to another type. Nashpy Game Theory textbook selection: https://nashpy.readthedocs.io/en/stab...
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A formula for the fixation probability for Moran processes with 2 types.
The Moran process on 2 types: a mathematically tractable model.
The Moran process with mutation
Selection probabilities for the Moran process on a game
Evolutionary stability of the Replicator Dynamics Equations
Stability of the replicator dynamics equation.
Moran processes and games: fitness functions from games.
The definition of the Moran process
Modelling evolution in a discrete population: motivating the Moran process
Using Python to solve the Replicator Dynamics Equation with Nashpy
Allowing for mutation in evolution: the replicator mutation dynamics equations.
A mathematical model of evolution: the replicator dynamics equations.
Evolution of aggression and sharing: the replicator dynamics with the Hawk Dove Game
Using Python to study the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma with the Axelrod library.
Axelrod's tournaments: a first computational case of understanding the emergence of cooperation.
The general form of the Prisoners Dilemma
Repeating the Prisoners Dilemma twice: does cooperation emerge?